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LEARNING FROM THE PAST: USING
KOREMATSU AND OTHER JAPANESE
INTERNMENT CASES TO PROVIDE
PROTECTIONS AGAINST IMMIGRATION
DETENTIONS
Caleb Ward*
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning
to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore, Send
these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the
golden door!” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the darkest periods in modern United States history
is reoccurring with mixed public approval. During World War II,
the United States government enacted executive orders creating a
curfew, proscribing living areas, and forcing the exclusion and
detention of all Japanese descendants from the West Coast.2 The
United States justified these grievous freedom and equality
violations through an increased need for national security
“because we [were] at war with [Japan].”3 However, this
perceived increased need for national security came from a
fraudulent assessment showing any Japanese-American could be
*Caleb Ward is a third-year law student at the University of Arkansas School of Law. He
graduated from the University of Arkansas with a bachelor’s degree in Anthropology in 2016
and in 2018 with a Master’s in the same subject. Interested in fighting social inequalities,
Caleb came to law school and plans to pursue a career in criminal law and/or civil rights law.
In trying to help while in law school, Caleb wrote the following article under the advisement
of Prof. Beth Zilberman to try to help stop and prevent immigration detention.
1. The Statue of Liberty. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND. (2002),
[https://perma.cc/44AB-8WLT] (reciting a poem inscribed on a plaque at the Statue of
Liberty).
2. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 85 (1943); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1944). Notably,
in this paper, exclusion means restricting access to enter, be within, or leave an area
proscribed by the Secretary of War. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
3. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
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planning espionage or sabotage of the United States.4 After the
war, the case constitutionalizing these detentions, Korematsu v.
United States, became a black mark in United States’
jurisprudential history, yet it has still not been completely
overturned.5 Despite this black mark, the United States is again
subjecting people to unwarranted detention based on alienage,
race, and national origin.6 By using only alienage, race, and
national origin to detain individuals and families in camps and
correctional facilities,7 the modern immigration detention scheme
mirrors that of Japanese internment. Despite Korematsu’s black
mark, the United States is, again, detaining persons with no real
detention time limit, but without a world war to provide a fragile
excuse for the detentions.8 Yet, the United States purportedly
stands for liberty, justice, and equality.9 However, immigration
detention, much like the Japanese internment, inhibits liberty,
justice, and equality for the immigrant populations and, in turn,
the United States’ ability to represent such ideals.10
4. See id. at 216-17; Eric L. Muller, Opinion, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court Was Right
to Overturn Korematsu. Now it Needs to Overrule Hirabayashi, L.A. TIMES , (July 3, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/9UMB-ZMJN] (noting that the representation of the danger posed by the
Japanese-Americans was later shown to be greatly exaggerated at the time).
5. See Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J. F. 629, 630 (2019);
Carl Takei, The Supreme Court’s Disingenuous Funeral Ceremony for Korematsu, ACLU
(July 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LFX4-6CKF]. But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, [and] has been
overruled in the court of history, . . . .”).
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 229 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting explicit “alien
Japanese” from Federal Order for exclusion); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88 (discussing need
to separate Germans and Italians based on alienage and Japanese based on national origin);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838, 847-48 (2018) (allowing permanent detention of
immigrants without bond hearing under current immigration law).
7. See Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence
of Plenary Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 118, 119, 123-24 (2018); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 139091 (2014).
8. See Release on bond or conditional parole—Criteria for detention or release—
Release from Custody under IIRAIRA, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & DEFENSE § 7:12 (2020) ; Jennings,
138 S. Ct. at 847-48 (declining to create a time-limit before giving bond hearing or
rehearing); see also Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human
Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
243, 256-58 (2013) (discussing the average length of detention pre-Jennings).
9. American Government: Democratic Values – Liberty, Equality, Justice,
USHISTORY.ORG, [https://perma.cc/EY2G-99TX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
10. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (holding person could not be detained
after pledging loyalty to United States or when granted leave).
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As noted in Trump v. Hawaii, Korematsu is not morally
good law.11 However, it is likely still valid precedent and unlikely
to be completely overturned.12 Its law and precedential value,
then, should be used to protect others from going through the
same degradation and violated rights the Japanese dealt with
seventy years ago.13 Primarily, Korematsu and other Japanese
internment cases created a standard for national origin and
alienage-based detention not met by current immigration
detention law.14 Their standard requires an extreme-level State
interest in national security akin to an imminent espionage threat
by indiscernible enemy combatants during a world war.15 This
standard should protect noncitizens from detention by instituting
a high standard to detain classes based on alienage, race, or
national origin. Under this high standard, modern immigration
detention becomes constitutionally impermissible.
Part II of this Article will focus on the history and precedent
created by Japanese internment in the United States as well as
modern immigration law allowing virtually indefinite immigrant
detention including those seeking asylum and humanitarian
protection.16 Part III then analyzes the two sets of law to show
how the Fourth Amendment issues under Korematsu, Ex parte
Endo, and Hirabayashi, could be argued as establishing a
protective, unmet standard for allowing the apprehension and
detention of noncitizens.17 This standard, then, reveals modern
immigration law to be unconstitutional while establishing a
standard to prevent future alienage-based detention.

11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
12. See Quinta Jurecic, The Travel Ban Decision and Ghost of Korematsu, LAWFARE
(June 28, 2018), [https://perma.cc/BLA7-LRK6].
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-220, 223 (1944); Kaelyne
Yumul Wietelman, Disarming Jackson’s (Re)Loaded Weapon: How Trump v. Hawaii
Reincarnated Korematsu and How They Can Be Overruled, 23 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
43, 53-56 (2019).
14. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20, 223 (describing the high standard); see
also Wietelman, supra note 13 (explaining how modern war on terror concerns do not
articulate a credible national security interest); Gilman, supra note 8, at 279-80 (highlighting
the fact that immigration detention in the United States does not meet international norms).
15. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20, 223.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND
Two sets of law in United States jurisprudence have allowed
the detention of groups of people based on alienage, race, and
national origin: law from Japanese internment and law for modern
immigration detention.18 Though having similar justifications
and results, the Supreme Court has only recognized Japanese
internment law as counter to United States’ values.19
Nonetheless, the cases retain their precedential value.20 The
second category, laws allowing near indefinite detention for
immigrants entering the country without a visa, remains good and
valid law despite its similarities to the previous category.21
However, the law set by the Japanese internment cases, should,
through its precedential value and societal backlash, prohibit the
same internment from occurring again.22 While the laws
themselves are abhorrent to American and humanitarian ideology,
they remain precedential law and should be used to correct the
same wrongs they once enabled. Essentially, arguments should
be made that the Japanese internment cases ensure detention
based on xenophobia cannot happen in the United States again.
A. Japanese Internment Precedent
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States
instigated two measures designed to protect the country from
imminent espionage and sabotage: Executive Orders 9066 and

18. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (1944) (acknowledging detention on basis of race,
though stating not using animus); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(quoting explicit “alien Japanese” from Federal Order for exclusion); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (discussing need to separate Germans and Italians based on
alienage and Japanese based on national origin); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 84748 (2018) (holding §§ 1225 and 1226 applies to the detention of virtually all illegal
immigrants).
19. See e.g. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
20. See Muller, supra note 4 (concerning Hirabayashi); Jurecic, supra note 12.
21. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (holding § 1225 applies to virtually all immigrants);
Release on bond or conditional parole—Criteria for detention or release—Release from
Custody under IIRAIRA, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & DEFENSE § 7:12 (2020) (explaining procedure
to allow indefinite detention).
22. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83, 104; Jurecic, supra
note 12.
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9102.23 Executive Order 9066 granted power to the Secretary of
War and their delegees to proscribe areas as military zones within
which certain groups were not allowed.24 Executive Order 9066
also granted the Secretary the authority to provide transportation,
food, and shelter to those ejected from these military exclusion
zones.25 Just a month after Executive Order 9066, President
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102 into action.26 Executive
Order 9102 established the War Relocation Authority and granted
it the power to enforce the exclusions from select areas which
were determined under Executive Order 9066.27 To secure the
removed person’s “relocation, maintenance and supervision,” the
order conferred various powers to authorities including the ability
to evacuate and supervise areas, purchase land, secure loans, as
well as make all regulations and delegations needed to enforce
Executive Order 9066.28
Hirabayashi v. United States was the first case to
substantively address these executive orders’ constitutionality.29
Just before Hirabayashi, Congress passed legislation making it a
misdemeanor to knowingly violate any order given under the
powers of Executive Orders 9066 or 9102.30 General DeWitt,
under Executive Orders 9066 and 9102, then ordered an exclusion
zone of the “entire Pacific Coast” due to its particular
vulnerability to espionage and sabotage.31 The exclusion required
all non-citizen Germans, Italians, Japanese, and all other persons
of Japanese ancestry to remain in their homes between 8:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m.32 The exclusion also required all the affected
persons to report to a Civil Control Center by May 11 or 12 to
register for evacuation.33 By ruling these acts constitutional, the
Supreme Court allowed exclusion, curfew, and removal based on
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85, 87.
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
Id.
Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (Mar. 18, 1942).
Id.
Id.
See Takei, supra note 5.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1943).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
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alienage and national origin to prevent imminent sabotage and
espionage from an indiscernible enemy combatant.34 The Court
allowed these actions as “an emergency war measure” because
there was, allegedly, not enough time to decipher which JapaneseAmericans were enemy combatants and which were normal
citizens before the war effort was impacted.35 Further, the Court’s
ruling should be argued as creating a standard with an extremelevel national security interest in order to detain based on alienage
or national origin.36
In Hirabayashi, Gordon Hirabayashi was arrested for
knowingly violating the imposed curfew and for failing to report
to a Civilian Control Station.37 To show the executive orders’
unconstitutionality, Hirabayashi argued he was not an enemy
combatant and therefore should not be subject to exclusion; he
proved this by showing his United States citizenship without an
allegiance to the Japanese Empire and his parents’ immigration
from Japan twenty-five years prior.38 Hirabayashi also claimed
he broke the curfew and failed to report to the Control Center to
avoid waiving his rights as a United States citizen.39 However,
the Supreme Court ruled that because Congress had ratified order
9066 through their own punitive legislation and all actions were
done to protect the United States from espionage and sabotage
from an enemy during war, the laws and regulations were
constitutional as “an emergency war measure.”40 Notably,
Hirabayashi, unlike the subsequent cases, remains virtually
uncontroverted precedent.41 In ruling for the government,
Hirabayashi creates a valid precedent allowing discrimination,
arrest, and eventually, detention based on alienage, race, and
nationality, but only as an emergency war measure to prevent
imminent espionage or sabotage.42
34. Id. at 88, 100-01.
35. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92, 99; Muller, supra note 4.
36. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95 (discussing the unique circumstances and threat
of imminent espionage allowing proscription).
37. Id. at 83-84.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 92.
41. Muller, supra note 4.
42. See id.
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Shortly after Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court included the
ability to detain under Executive Orders 9066 and 9102, but
importantly, did not alter the extreme security interest
necessary.43 In Korematsu, the order at issue fully excluded all
persons of Japanese origin, requiring them to leave the entire
Pacific Coast exclusion zone.44 Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu
refused to be removed from the West Coast merely for being a
Japanese-American.45 The Court upheld the ability to exclude
and detain based on national origin and alienage, but noted it
required the “gravest imminent danger to the public safety[.]”46
Further, the Court allowed a broad racial application due to the
threat’s apparent gravity.47 Military authorities had falsely48
shown it impossible to distinguish between the disloyal and the
loyal Japanese-Americans in the timely manner required to
protect national security.49 The Court held “[t]he power to
exclude include[d] the power to do [so] by force . . . .”50 Thus,
the detention in “relocation centers,” or military detention centers,
was constitutional despite a detainee’s total compliance with the
exclusion orders.51 However, as the Court indicated, doing so still
required an imminent and extreme threat to national security from
an indiscernible enemy combatant.52
When combined,
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, establish precedent allowing
discrimination, arrest, and detention based on alienage, race, and
nationality, but only as an emergency war measure to prevent
imminent espionage or sabotage.53

43. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
44. See id. at 218 (discussing how the full exclusion is a graver constitutional threat
than the curfew).
45. Id. at 215-16.
46. Id. at 218. See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting
explicit “alien Japanese” language from the Federal Order for exclusion).
47. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
48. Muller, supra note 4. Though the Court cited “intelligence” and reports as
establishing the threat, in reality any such report was based not on actual intel but on an
official’s personal, racist ideas.
49. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
50. Id. at 223.
51. Id. at 221-22.
52. Id. at 223.
53. See Muller, supra note 4.
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The last fundamental case constructing the Japanese
internment law is Ex parte Mitsuye Endo. Mitsuye Endo, unlike
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, had followed all evacuation orders
but was still detained in Tule Lake War Relocation Center.54
Prior to the case, the War Relocation Authority had determined it
could grant leave from Relocation Centers to persons, pending a
leave delegation decision.55 To determine leave clearance, the
delegation would investigate the effect of a petitioner’s release on
the war effort, public peace, and security of issuing indefinite
leave.56 However, leave clearance alone would not allow leaving
a Relocation Center.57 Instead, petitioners also had to apply for
leave and meet at least one of fourteen conditions.58 Even with
the conditions met, petitioners could still have been denied leave
if the delegation determines the leave community is improper for
petitioners.59 Endo applied and received leave clearance but
never applied for indefinite leave.60 Notably, Endo’s loyalty to
the United States went unchallenged, just as Endo did not
challenge the validity of her detention under armed guard for her
Japanese ancestry.61 The Government’s main argument for
requiring continued detention, after showing loyalty, hinged on
the belief “that the interior states would not accept an
uncontrolled Japanese migration.”62 The Court held, since Endo
had uncontested loyalty, it was unlawful for the War Relocation
Authority to keep detaining her.63 Because Endo no longer
presented an espionage or sabotage threat, she could not be
lawfully detained by the War Relocation Authority.64 Thus, even
in the Japanese internment cases, once the extreme threat to
national security dissipated, a person could not be detained for
their alienage, race, or national origin.65
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284-85 (1944).
Id. at 290.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Endo, 323 U.S. at 293.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 295-96 (quoting General DeWitt’s report to chief of staff).
Id. at 297.
Endo, 323 U.S. at 302-04.
Id.
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Taken together, these three cases and the two executive
orders, create a standard for detaining persons based on their
alienage, race, or national origin.66 Because the Fourth
Amendment and Endo both apply to a person, as opposed to a
citizen, the rights surrounding detention also apply to
noncitizens.67 According to the executive orders, Hirabayashi,
and Korematsu, persons can be detained only to prevent an
extreme threat to national security which must equal imminent
espionage by an indiscernible enemy combatant, during wartime,
when the danger to national security prevents any narrower acts.68
However, as indicated in Endo, the person can no longer be
detained once they no longer present a threat to the national
security interest.69
Recently, Trump v. Hawaii, a case assessing the
constitutionality of President Trump’s “Travel Ban,” stated
Korematsu was “overruled in the court of history” and
unconstitutional.70 However, this overruling was most likely
dicta as, just lines before, the court acknowledged Korematsu had
nothing to do with the case.71 Though contentious, Korematsu
likely still retains precedential value.72 Even if Korematsu was
overruled though, Hirabayashi sets the same, high standard of an
extreme-national security threat while the nation is at war for
excluding based on alienage, race, and national origin.73 Further,
Hirabayashi has not had subsequent cases question its validity.74
Following Korematsu and Hirabayashi, the government can
create laws to detain individuals based on alienage, race, and
national origin only to protect extreme national security
66. See supra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
67. Endo, 323 U.S. at 287-88. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added).
68. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99, 102-04 (1943).
69. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 302.
70. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417, 2423 (2018).
71. Greene, supra note 5, at 629.
72. Id.
73. See Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 735, 735-36, 754 (2020).
74. Amanda L. Tyler, Courts and the Executive in Wartime: A Comparative Study of
the American and British Approaches to the Internment of Citizens During World War II and
Their Lessons for Today, 107 CAL. L. REV. 789, 848 (2019).
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interests.75 Thus, the ability to detain a person based on alienage,
race, or national origin occurs narrowly and only in light of an
extreme national security interest where it is necessary to stop an
enemy combatant from espionage during wartime.76 Further, any
proof the detained does not present such a threat to the interest
requires release, or at least the potential for release.77
B. Immigration Detention Law
While immigration law has fluctuated throughout American
history, since the late 1990s the government has increased the
restrictions and penalties for those who enter the country prior to
seeking visas or green cards.78 To understand the current legal
state, a synopsis of modern law followed by its history and
evolution is given below.
1. Current Law and Plenary Power
Beginning in the 1980s with the war on drugs, and increasing
especially with the events on September 11, 2001, immigration
and detention policies intensified.79 These increases culminated
in the modern system where individuals without immigration
authorization, including those who arrive at the border seeking
protection, can be detained until a final removal hearing
determination.80 In other cases with civil detention, the
government generally must show the person to be a danger to the
community, a flight risk, or an enemy noncitizen.81 To appeal an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent’s decision to
75. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88, 103-04 (1943) (allowing the legislation and subsequent
detentions based on race, alienage, and national origin due to the extreme threat of espionage
and sabotage during war time).
76. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218, 223; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88, 92, 95.
77. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302, 304 (1944).
78. See Sharon A. Healey, The Trend Toward the Criminalization and Detention of
Asylum Seekers,
25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 181, 182 (2004).
79. García Hernández, supra note 7, at 1350, 1414.
80. See Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
2141, 2147-48 (2017).
81. See id. at 2146.
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detain, the burden on appeal rests with the noncitizen to show they
are not a flight risk or a danger to the community.82 Complicating
this further is the detention scheme set in 8 U.S.C. section 1226
which mandates detention for any noncitizen that has committed
any offense with a possible penalty of one-year or more in
prison.83
Additionally, the plenary power doctrine underlies and
complicates much of immigration law and the law’s ability to
change over time. The Supreme Court, in 1889, first declared that
the government’s legislative and executive branches had
generally unreviewable control of the nation’s immigration
policies and laws.84 The plenary power doctrine originally
granted both branches and their administrative agencies the power
to make laws and policies that were virtually unreviewable by the
judiciary.85 In practice, this doctrine gave incredibly high
deference to the executive and legislative branch’s immigration
laws, especially when national security was at issue.86 The
doctrine peaked in the 1950s when Knauff v. Shaughnessy held
that any procedure authorized by Congress met constitutional due
process, including indefinite detention of some noncitizens postremoval proceedings.87
2. Doctrinal History and Evolution to Current State
Since the 1950s, the Court began to review, and even
overrule, some of the laws made by Congress and the executive.88
The plenary power doctrine’s application, though, continues to be
fairly nebulous.89 The Court has shown itself willing to both
82. See id. at 2146.
83. Id. at 2146-47; 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
84. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889); Jennifer
Gordon, Immigration As Commerce: A New Look At The Federal Immigration Power and
Constitution, 93 IND. LAW J. 653, 661 (2018); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in The
Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79 (2017).
85. Gordon, supra note 84, at 654.
86. See id. at 654-55.
87. Id. at 664-665; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950).
88. Kim, supra note 84, at 79.
89. See id. at 89-91 (discussing the decline of plenary power’s use without a solid,
predictable explanation).
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review immigration laws and policies without mentioning plenary
power, and uphold laws and executive orders under the doctrine.90
For example, in 2003, Zadvydas v. Davis overturned
Shaughessy’s ruling to disallow indefinite detainment for
noncitizens with a final removal order.91 Recently, the Supreme
Court held noncitizens have a right to habeas corpus review for
unlawful detention, but not to gain asylum, and only if the
noncitizen was statutorily granted such due process right by
Congress.92 One main theme for when the Court grants deference
to the government is when national sovereignty or national
security requires a unified approach.93 The core logic of plenary
power, since its inception, was to allow the nation to “speak with
one voice” on topics of national security and foreign affairs.94
Despite the willingness to review, though, Congress and
delegated agencies or positions, like the Attorney General, retain
power and discretion to act within immigration law when national
security and foreign affairs are at issue.95
Beginning in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reformation and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)96 created a
system for “expedited removal” in order to “put certain criminal
aliens on a fast track for deportation.”97 IIRIRA required all
immigrants who presented themselves at the border without
documentation to be detained and assessed for expedited
removal.98 This requirement includes asylum seekers even
90. See id. at 87-88; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, C.,
concurring) (citing Shaugnessey, 338 U.S. 537) (“the President has inherent authority to
exclude aliens from the country.”).
91. Kim, supra note 84, at 87-88. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 689
(2001) (distinguishing Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537 and discussing Congressional intent and
meaning to create a presumptive time limit).
92. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, No. 19-161, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. June 25, 2020) (slip
opinion).
93. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 38-41 (2015).
94. Id. at 40-41.
95. See id.; Kim, supra note 84, at 96.
96. Healey, supra note 78, at 182; Illegal Immigration Reformation and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 , Pub. L. 104-208 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
97. Deborah Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Mandatory Predeportation Detention Provision of Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)) As Amended, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 325, 325 (2003).
98. See § 302 IIRIRA; Healey, supra note 78, at 182.
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though these refugees are fleeing from countries refusing to give
them the proper documentation.99 Once detained, the asylum
seekers can try to prove their need for an asylum hearing by
proving a credible fear of returning to their country.100 Even if
the asylum seeker has a credible fear, they remain in detention
unless they are eligible for parole.101 Yet, the decision for parole
is made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
detaining entity, without many guiding regulations.102
Even if eligible for parole, DHS can set bond with
supervision orders or release the noncitizen on the their own
recognizance - which frequently requires some indication of
financial stability, like being able to live with a family member or
support themselves.103 Officially, the practice is to release
noncitizens after an immigration court denies removal orders 104
However, cases have shown that the immigrants and asylum
seekers with favorable hearings have been detained throughout
DHS’s appeals.105 Though civil immigration detention cannot be
used as punishment, this practice is designed to deter immigrants
and asylum seekers from coming to the United States.106
More broadly, IIRIRA altered the Immigration and
Nationality Act to include sections demarcating noncitizens with
certain criminal convictions for mandatory detention.107 8 U.S.C.
sections 1225-27, codified the procedures for detention of
noncitizens in removal.108 The statutes also allow continued
detention during the entirety of the removal process without bond
or parole determination for mandatory detention.109 This allows

99. See Healey, supra note 78, at 182.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 182-83.
102. Id. at 183.
103. Id. at 188.
104. See Healey, supra note 78, at 183.
105. See id.
106. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. 237, 237-39 (2019).
107. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, The Perverse Logic of Immigration
Detention:
Unraveling the Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants Based on Markers of Race and
Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 359, 360-61 (2012); Buckman, supra note 97, at
325.
108. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-27.
109. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).
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immigration judges to deny bond in non-mandatory cases.110 In
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court assessed the
mandatory components of these statutes and determined the
propriety of detention without bond or parole.111 First, the Court
examined section 1225 and its ability to detain without bond or
parole.112 It recognized section 1225(b)(1) as authorizing
detention of immigrants entering by “fraud, misrepresentation, or
lack of valid documentation.”113 The Court also recognized
1225(b)(2) “as a catchall provision that applies to all
applicants. . . .”114 Section 1225(b)(1) created the ability to
remove noncitizens without a hearing; however it carves out an
exception for asylum seekers, though requiring that they remain
in detention.115 Section 1225(b)(2), however, acts as a catchall
requiring other noncitizens to be detained pending a complete
removal hearing when an officer cannot immediately determine
are “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted into the
country.”116
The Court then went on to interpret sections 1226 and 1227.
These sections deal with removal procedure for immigrants
already in the country.117 Section 1226(c) iterates the categories
described in 1227 as well as provides the Attorney General power
to issue warrants and arrest noncitizens with certain criminal
convictions for a removal proceeding and detention.118 The
statutes also do not require the Attorney General to set bond or
parole.119 Like section 1225, section 1226 permits immigrant
detention until their removal proceeding is fully completed.120
The Jennings v. Rodriguez decision affirmed this indefinite
detention of noncitizens awaiting a removal hearing without a
continuing chance for a bond hearing, by relying on the plenary
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 836.
See id. at 836-37.
Id. at 837.
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837.
Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1227.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)-(c); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
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power doctrine.121 However, section 1226(c), as used in
Jennings, applies to noncitizens with criminal convictions or
alleged criminal conduct already in the country, whereas section
1225 applies only to those seeking admittance.122 Because
Jennings concerned a lawful permanent resident going through
the removal proceedings for committing a crime, pursuant to
section1226(c), the Court elided the interpretation and detention
abilities for sections 1225 and 1226.123 Jennings also held that
since parole and bond hearings were only narrowly applicable,
sections 1225 and 1226 do not require a bond hearing nor a
explicit time limit on mandatory detention.124
In Jennings, the Petitioners argued that the lack of a statutory
time limit and precedential weight requires an individualized
hearing to show the need to detain the immigrant, before
prolonged detention.125 The Court, however, distinguished
detention under sections 1225 and 1226 from the existing
immigration precedent, namely Zadvydas v. Davis, requiring a
bond hearings after six months of detention.126 The Court
distinguished Jennings since it concerned ongoing proceedings
under sections 1225 and 1226 instead of hearings requiring
removal under section 1231—which concerned the detention and
removal of immigrants who were ordered removed from the
United States.127 The Court found sections 1225 and 1226 do not
allow indefinite detention since the statutes have a terminal event:
final adjudication.128 Again, though, detention can last months or
years depending on the appellate process and immigration court
backlog.129 Under both statutes and Jennings, immigration
authorities are free to detain immigrants and asylum seekers
indefinitely based solely on their alienage.130
121. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844 (using the Congress’s differing statutory language
to overturn the Court of Appeals application of Zadvydas v. Davis in this case).
122. Id. at 845.
123. See id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying three separate categories here
and in analysis).
124. Id. at 842 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 839.
126. Jennings, 138 S. Ct at 843.
127. Id.; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-27.
128. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 845-6.
129. See Healey, supra note 78, at 182-83.
130. See supra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
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The recent decision in Matter of M-S-, a case from the Board
of Immigration Appeals, cites Jennings and various statutes to
force detention on asylum seekers after establishing credible
fear.131 In the case, the respondent, an asylum seeker who was
originally placed on expedited removal, was placed in a full
removal proceeding after showing credible fear for asylum and
granted bond through an immigration court.132 Attorney General
Barr, however, found the immigrant was not eligible for bond
before completing his full removal and asylum proceeding.133
This case, then, overturned Board precedent allowing asylum
seekers who established credible fear to have a custody
redetermination hearing before an immigration judge.134 It also
ignores an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
requiring warrants to continue detaining immigrants transferred
from expedited to full proceedings.135 Instead, the opinion
excludes bond and bond hearings for immigrants after
transferring to the lengthier process unless they fit within the
narrow, explicit exceptions for temporary parole: urgent
humanitarian crises or significant public benefits.136 The opinion
only validates its interpretation by determining that the parole
statute was exhaustive while the statute with categories requiring
detention was non-exhaustive.137 Thus, asylum seekers could be
included implicitly in the required detention category and only
paroled for two exceptions.138 Although the Board treats all
detentions equal, the Board chose to detain more immigrants for
longer periods with no real justification other than its having the
ability.139
Notably, noncitizens are deemed “detained” in the facilities,
sometimes jails and prisons, instead of incarcerated, since
131. Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509-10 (Att’y Gen. 2019). As of publication
date, this is still valid law though distinguished in the 9th Circuit.
132. Id.at 510.
133. Id.
134. Id (calling prior case, Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (BIA 2005) “wrongly
decided”).
135. See id. at 515-16.
136. M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 516.
137. Id. at 515-16.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 509-10, 515-19.
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immigration law is civil meaning it cannot use punitive
measures.140 The Supreme Court has even held that the label of
civil immigration law does not allow Congress to make
fundamentally punitive acts applicable to noncitizens.141 Yet, the
Court ruled deportation is akin to criminal punishment.142
However, it refused to expand the law to include civil
detention.143 Additionally, Matter of M-S- expands the category
of those immigrants who are ineligible for bond to include those
apprehended within the United States borders.144
The modern state of immigration detention, then, permits
detaining noncitizens and asylum seekers without proper
documentation at the border and either putting them on an
expedited removal track or continuing detention until removal
and asylum hearings and their appeals end.145 Once detained,
immigrants and asylum seekers remain detained as deterrence for
other immigrants.146 This detention lasts throughout their
proceedings without any time limit, opportunity for a bond
hearing, or a realistic opportunity for parole.147 The detention
ends only after a final adjudication of their removal
proceedings.148 Further, the statutes’ interpretation separated this
detainment from prior immigration cases, which required bond
hearings, allowing cases brought under section 1225 - 1227 to
result in near indefinite detention.149 As immigration laws, they
are all also statutes granting permission to detain solely on the
basis of alienage.150 Because the mere label of civil deterrence
cannot prevent constitutional protections, the same standard set
140. See García Hernández, supra note 7, at 1413 (discussing facilities used to detain).
141. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
142. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (“Our law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century . . . .”).
143. See id (affirming proceedings were still civil).
144. M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. at 515-16.
145. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).
146. Ryo, supra note 106 at 237-39.
147. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (describing statutory procedures); Healey, supra
note 78, at 188 (discussing difficulty posting bond even after qualifying).
148. Buckman, supra note 97, at § 5 (citing Kwon v. Comfort, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1144-45 (D. Colo. 2001)).
149. See Gilman, supra note 8, at 256-58 (explaining the procedure can last years and
lasts longer when fought).
150. HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2019).
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by the Japanese internment laws to allow detention for alienage,
race, or national origin should govern the immigrants’ detention
for their alienage.151
III. APPLICATION
Immigration detention generally falls under civil law since
“[u]nlawful presence in the United States does not itself constitute
a federal crime. . . .”152 Under civil law, the United States can
only detain individuals when a legitimate, special interest
outweighs the person’s constitutional interest in remaining
free.153 However, the detention cannot constitute punishment.154
In the past, the United States has traditionally recognized three
situations that provide the ability to detain people through civil
law.155 These situations occur when the detainee is a danger to
the community, a flight risk, or an extreme national security
risk.156 Notably, the second category can be considered largely
inapplicable. Little to no evidence exists showing asylum seekers
to be a flight risk; instead, when noncitizens were released on
community-based detention alternatives, there was a ninety-six
percent appearance rate.157 For example, those released on their
own recognizance maintained a seventy-eight percent compliance
rate.158 Thus, the ability to detain immigrants and asylum seekers
until their removal proceedings are finalized likely only occurs
pursuant to the first and third categories.159 Similarly, national
security was the justification for Japanese internment during

151. Matt Ford, The Return of Korematsu, THE ATLANTIC, (Nov. 19, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/THL4-A349].
152. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing case law and
statutes concerning Immigration and Nationality Act).
153. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
154. See id. (elaborating on when civil detention can occur).
155. See id. at 688-92 (discussing national security as well as two statutory reasons to
civilly detain).
156. See id; R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (citing cases requiring consideration of
national security and deterrence value in asylum seeker release hearings).
157. Marouf, supra note 80, at 2165.
158. See generally id. at 2155-70 (discussing alternatives and successes); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (emphasizing low flight risks).
159. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 17 (2019).

2021

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

859

World War II.160 In fact, to allow the Japanese interment, the
Court elided the first and third categories so the perceived
community danger both increased the national security risk and
was amplified by the ongoing war.161 Statutes and case law, like
Jennings, have tried to separate immigration from the typical civil
detention scheme.162 However, the ability to detain, even by
statute, must comport with the Supreme Court’s standard for
detaining based on alienage, race, or national origin: the standard
set out by the Japanese internment cases.163
The first category, presenting a danger to the community,
allows “preventive detention based on dangerousness only when
limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong
procedural protections.”164 Moreover, for a potentially indefinite
detention, like in immigration, the danger must be coupled with
“some other special circumstance.”165 To detain under the third
category, national security risk, the government must show a
direct and actual national security risk.166 Together, these
categories created the justification for detention in the Japanese
internment cases, which means their precedent creates the
minimum standard for long-term civil detention under these
interests.167 Current immigration detention reasons, in turn, fall
far short from meeting the Japanese internment cases’ standard.168
Simply, immigration detention fails to justify itself through an
actual and acute threat or concerning especially dangerous
individuals.169 For instance, to allow the ability to detain all
immigrants, judges had to interpret the immigration detention
160. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944).
161. See id. at 217-18.
162. See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842-46 (2018).
163. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
92 (1943).
164. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001).
165. Id. at 691.
166. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 190 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Incantation of the
magic words ‘national security’ without further substantiation is simply not enough to justify
significant deprivations of liberty.”).
167. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92.
168. Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18, and Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92, with
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842-846.
169. Gilman, supra note 8, at 318, 321; See also Megan Shields Casturo, Civil
Immigration Detention: When Civil Detention Turns Carceral, 122 PENN STATE L. REV.
825, 830, 840 (2018).
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statutes as applying to criminal-immigrants, undocumented
immigrants, and those seeking asylum equally despite different
statutory sections for each.170 Further, the national security issues
center on resource allocation issues within ICE, and only a
minority of immigrants present a community threat, despite even
the slightest criminal charge being used to deny bond.171 Thus,
neither of the two state interests rise to the level of indiscernible
enemy plotting imminent sabotage during war, which should be
required to allow long-term detentions as it was with Japanese
internment.
The Japanese internment cases allowed civil detention based
on alienage, race, and national origin only for the heightened and
specific national security and community danger interests.172 The
ability to detain came from statutes and executive orders granting
the Secretary of War and their designees the ability to detain
classes based on alienage, race, and national origin.173 These
statutes, as seen in the cases, were only constitutional due to the
heightened national security at the time—acting as an
“emergency war measure.”174 Notably, the Court did not
elaborate or require a general timeframe for release. The Court
was satisfied that at some point a resolution would occur releasing
all detainees.175 Thus, though there was no timeframe in months
or years for the detention’s end, making it for an indeterminate
period, it was still constitutional.176
The statutes were
constitutional, though, only because of both the ongoing war with
Japan and the plead threat about imminent espionage or sabotage
from indiscernible enemy combatants within the country, which
seemingly heightened the government’s national security
interests.177 Together, the war and espionage threat heightened
170. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837-38 (finding the statute applies equally).
171. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88; Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 228-29 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting explicit “alien Japanese” from Federal
Order for exclusion); Marouf, supra note 80, at 2147-48 (discussing shoplifting and minimal
marijuana charges as reasons for detention).
172. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S at 92 (calling it an “emergency war measure”).
173. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-18.
174. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92.
175. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222 (acknowledging detention was for an
indeterminate period).
176. Id. at 221-23.
177. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88.
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national security by appearing to create a time pressure to prevent
imminent espionage and sabotage from indiscernible
combatants.178 Because the cases allowed civil detention based
on alienage and national origin, their precedent creates the
standard for all similar detentions.
The law and reasoning behind immigration detention mirrors
the Japanese internment cases.179 However, it lacks the
heightened interests required for continuous detention. Like the
Japanese internment cases, the ability to detain immigrants and
asylum seekers came from statutes, regulations, Executive
Orders, and agencies guidance.180 Underpinning these statutes,
though ignored in Jennings, should be an extreme need to protect
communities or national security.181 However, the argument for
both arises largely from economic concerns in dealing with mass
migration not an actual threat to safety.182 However the biggest
national security risk, presented in R.I.L.-R, is a fear of resource
allocation due to an influx of immigrants, not a direct and actual
attack or threat to citizens’ safety.183 Similarly, though political
speeches claim an increased immigrant crime rate which
endangers communities, research from Texas showed
immigrants, especially undocumented and asylees, have a lower
crime rate than United States born persons.184 Thus, even if both
claimed interests were valid and combined, the threat to national

178. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95 (emphasizing the urgency of the situation
precipitated by the attack on Pearl Harbor).; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
179. See Rosenbaum, supra note 7.
180. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (acknowledging the plenary
power doctrine requires judicial deference).
181. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688; see generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830
(2018).
182. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C 2015).
183. Id.
184. See Horsley, FACT CHECK: Trump, Illegal Immigration, and Crime, NPR (June
22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PP2Q-4H94] (discussing rhetoric like: “‘They don’t talk about
the death and destruction caused by people who shouldn’t be here,’ the president said.
‘People that will continuously get into trouble and do bad things’”); Alex Nowrasteh,
Criminal Immigrants in Texas: Illegal Immigrant Conviction and Arrest Rates for homicide,
Sex Crimes, Larceny, and Other Crimes, CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. AND POL’Y BRIEF NO.
4, [https://perma.cc/ZGF4-92S6].
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security and communities fall far short of the Japanese internment
standard.185
Similarly, the immigration statues, like those for Japanese
internment, have been held to only allow definite detention since
the detention is terminated upon final decision in a removal
proceeding.186 The final decision, and in turn detention, could
potentially last months or years. Yet, the notion of an eventual
final decision by a court, satisfied the Supreme Court that
immigrant detainees were not detained indefinitely.187 Because
the national security and community danger concerns generally
deal with relatively minor economic issues, they do not usurp the
immigrants’ constitutional interest in remaining free.188
The differences between state interests in each detention
reveal the Japanese internment’s standard for event-terminated
detention based on alienage, race, and national origin set is unmet
by current immigration law. For Japanese internment, the Court,
though based on misrepresented intelligence data,189 saw a dire
situation where Japanese or Japanese-American hidden
combatants planned to sabotage the United States during the
ongoing war.190 This inability to timely distinguish the loyal,
non-combatant Japanese-Americans, from the potential, hidden
agents to prevent espionage, combined with the already
heightened security interests from the ongoing war, allowed their
detentions.191
Further, the language in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu, stating the detention’s validity as an “emergency war
measure” indicate these threats are the minimum standard for

185. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1994); see also R.I.L-R, 80
F. Supp. 3d at 189.
186. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845 (2018). But see Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 874 (Breyer concurrence) (pointing out the detentions are, effectually, indefinite).
187. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (fining sections are not “‘silent’ as to the length of
detention [since i]t mandates detention ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States’”).
188. See R.I.L.-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (finding plead governmental interests in
national security through resource use inadequate).
189. Muller, supra note 4.
190. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
99 (1943)).
191. Id. at 218-19.

2021

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

863

detention.192 Allowing detention as an emergency war measure
indicates that, without a similar level of a national security
interest, the detention could not be constitutional.193 Thus, it
should be argued the government, though based on
misinformation, created a standard allowing civil detention due to
a specific and extremely high national security concern. This
standard requires a threat equal to the safety and integrity of the
United States during an ongoing World War from indiscernible
enemy combatants.194
As for the concerns allowing detention, modern political
rhetoric attempts to increase community apprehension regarding
the danger that immigration poses, but lacks evidence to verify
the claims.195 For instance, then-Presidential candidate Trump
famously said Mexico was sending “people that have lots of
problems, . . . [] [t]hey’re bringing drugs[, t]hey’re bringing
crime[, and t]hey’re rapists.”196 Since then, Trump and his
supporters have continued an inaccurate crime-focused narrative
of noncitizens to justify increasing immigration regulation.197 At
a rally in Wisconsin, then-Presidential candidate Trump stated
that unauthorized migration massively strains “communities and
schools and hospitals and public resources, like nobody’s ever
seen before.”198 This rhetoric attempts to increase community
apprehension regarding the danger immigration poses to
communities by hyperbolizing any potential danger to
infrastructure and crime rates.
However, the studies comparing native born and immigrant
crime rates negate this perception.199 For instance, illegal
immigrants are 16% less likely to commit homicide, about 7.9%
less likely to commit sexual crimes, and 77% less likely to
192. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
219-20.
193. See id. at 99-100.
194. See id. at 99.
195. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015, 2:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/SK4HDHUW].
196. Id.
197. See Horsley, supra note 183.
198. Calvin Woodard & Hope Yen, AP FACT CHECK: Trump’s misleading rhetoric
on immigrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/S3ZJ-WDSG].
199. Hee Lee, supra note 194; Horsley, supra note 183; Nowrasteh, supra note 183.
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commit larceny than the native-born populations.200 In drug
crimes during 2013, four out of five smuggling arrests involved
United States citizens.201 Overall, male immigrants ages 18 to 59
have an internal incarceration rate of 1.6%, while native-born
males have an incarceration rate of 3.3%.202 Despite the political
rhetoric, immigrants pose virtually no significant danger to their
communities.
Additional political rhetoric implies that undocumented
immigrants and asylum seekers must be detained in order to
thwart terrorist attacks under the guise of immigration and
asylum.203 Even more than the increased crime rates, though,
there is no evidence to support this. In fact, between 1975 and
2017, the chance of being killed by an asylee or undocumented
noncitizen was 1 in 1.3 billion.204 Further, when caught or
applying for asylum, the noncitizens must still pass through the
terrorist vetting procedures before they are permitted to stay.205
Thus, immigrants and asylum seekers pose virtually no threat to
the United States populace through increased crime or terroristic
threats.206
Next, the arguments around national security in immigration
fall drastically short of this standard. The national security
concerns in immigration arise largely from an economic strain on
ICE personnel and resources.207 However, the supposed
economic strain on ICE does not indicate an immigration influx
would weaken ICE, “overwhelm[] the country’s borders or
wreak[] havoc in southwestern cities.”208 This threat to ICE’s
resource allocation209 cannot be equivalent to espionage and
sabotage by an indiscernible enemy combatant during wartime.
Though increased immigration would likely increase the local
200. Nowrasteh, supra note 183.
201. Hee Lee, supra note 194 (citing a Center for Investigative Reporting study).
202. Id. (citing American Immigration Council report on 2010 Census data).
203. See Alex Nowrasteh, Does The Migrant Caravan Pose A Serious Terrorism
Risk?, CATO INST., (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:19 PM), [https://perma.cc/SQ3X-CJF7].
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C. 2015).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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infrastructural costs, a purely economic threat to increased
resource use does not necessarily rise to the level of a national
security threat.210 Current immigration national security interests
only concern a minor, if existent, economic strain on a single
administrative agency failing to meet the minimum standard to
detain all immigrants.211 Even the minimal threat immigrants do
pose falls far short of the extreme national security threat standard
created by the Japanese internment cases.212 A slight increased
strain on infrastructural budgets, watered-down crime rates, and
the small chance of terrorism cannot equal the threat to national
security that imminent espionage by indiscernible enemy
combatants pose. Therefore, neither of the required underlying
interests for constitutional civil detention are met concerning
immigrant detention.213
Together, the Japanese internment cases create a high
standard for detaining classes based on alienage, race, and
national origin. To civilly detain based on alienage or national
origin, the government must show an extreme interest in national
security, akin to an imminent threat by an indiscernible enemy
combatant during an ongoing war.214 Then, if the detention is
pending an event without a known timeframe, the government
must also show that if released, the detainee would pose a threat
to the public.215 Importantly, even if this standard is met, the

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Illegal Immigration
Crisis and Border Security, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1. 2018, 4:19 PM),
[https://perma.cc/2NBM-7JB3] (pleading mostly economic harm from increased “illegal
immigration”); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1944)
(explaining that the compulsory exclusion of citizens from their homes would be inconsistent
with basic governmental institutions, unless doing so would prevent espionage and sabotage
in dire circumstances).
213. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (upholding the legality of the exclusion order
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from threatened areas at certain times, so as to protect
against espionage and sabotage).
214. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (requiring special
dangerousness and strong procedural protections to civilly detain based on future danger);
see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99
(1943)) (using potential espionage by an indiscernible enemy combatant as standard for
dangerous group).
215. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91.
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government must release the detainee if the detainee proves not
to be a threat to national security or the community.216
Current immigration detention, then, fails this standard and,
therefore, should not be permitted. The alleged threat to national
security comes not from a fear of imminent espionage or sabotage
but from unsubstantiated claims of increased crime and
speculated infrastructural strain on ICE.217 Further, even this
threat could be ameliorated through alternative, cost-effective,
and more humane measures to ensure asylum seekers, refugees,
and other immigrants appear in court.218 For instance, parole
programs or ankle monitors, though also problematic, drastically
reduce costs while ensuring court appearances.219 The saved
money could be channeled back to ease the infrastructural
burden.220
Further, to review detention, courts can overcome the
plenary power doctrine by reviewing the standard set by the
Japanese internment cases, an extreme national security interest,
is met before granting any judicial deference to the statutes and
administrative policies.221 Because the plenary power doctrine
must still comport with constitutional rights and interests and
immigration detention is civil detention based on alienage and
national origin, courts should ensure that the constitutional
standard requiring an extreme security interest is met before
granting the law’s plenary power deference.222
The next argument for using Korematsu to prevent
prolonged or nearly indefinite immigrant detentions pulls not
from existing law, but from constitutional and cultural values. At
the beginning, this Article quoted the inscription and description
216. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
217. See Remarks by President Trump on the Illegal Immigration Crisis and Border
Security, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1. 2018, 4:19 PM), [https://perma.cc/74EW-24FT].
218. Healey, supra note 78, at 188-89 (noting a high success rate and halved cost for a
parole or telephone surveillance system to ensure appearances in court).
219. Marouf, supra note 80, at 2161-62.
220. Id. at 2160, 2162, 2165; see ROBERT RECTOR & JASON RICHWINE, THE
HERITAGE FOUND., FISCAL COST OF UNLAWFUL IMMIGRANTS AND AMNESTY TO THE U.S.
TAXPAYER 15 (May 6th, 2013); see David Becerra et al., Fear vs. Facts: Examining the
Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S., 39 W. MICH. U. J. SOC. & SOC.
WELFARE 111, 128 (2012).
221. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20; Gordon, supra note 84. at 661.
222. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-20; Gordon, supra note 84, at 661.
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for the Statue of Liberty.223 Though definitionally changing
through time, the United States always meant to stand for justice,
liberty, and equality for all persons.224 To stand for these values,
these cruxes of the American way, they must be deeper than facial
policy concerns or self-aggrandizing sentiment. Instead of
learning from our mistakes in Japanese internment, the country is
again detaining groups of people based on alienage and national
origin.225 This time on a people seeking hope, a new life, or
refuge. The United States cannot say it stands for freedom,
liberty, and justice while detaining those who seek protection and
hope.
The United States was supposed to be a beacon of hope, the
City on the Hill, to inspire the world to follow it in providing
freedom and equality for all peoples.226 Yet, laws allowing,
proscribing, and requiring prolonged detention for immigrants,
from those seeking asylum to those wanting a better life, violate
these core tenets.227 In this xenophobic mindset, the United States
deprives itself of what was supposed to make it great. Worse, this
exact situation has happened in the past: interning hundreds of
thousands of Japanese and Japanese Americans based on a
misrepresented notion they posed some threat to the United States
during World War II. Since then, the United States claims to
regret not standing for liberty and freedom for a group within its
borders.228
And now, again, the United States is detaining a more
vulnerable population who just seek protection and/or a better life
for themselves and their family.229 Instead of having open arms
223. Lazarus, supra note 1.
224. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl.
225. See Jack Rockers & Elizabeth Troutman, Dangerous Detention: Human Rights
Standards and Enforcement in Immigration Detention, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF L.
IMMIGR. & HUM. RTS. POL’Y CLINIC 1, 6, 9 (2009).
226. John F. Kennedy, City Upon a Hill Speech JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL
LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U9KY-PFKR]
(Transcript of President-elect John F. Kennedy, addressing a Joint Convention of the General
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Jan. 9, 1961),
227. Rockers & Troutman, supra note 225, at 22, 23.
228. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (stating Korematsu was wrong
the day it was decided and has been overruled through cultural history).
229. . E.C. Gogolak, Ankle Monitors Weigh in on Immigrant Mothers Released from
Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), [https://perma.cc/75E3-YFW7].
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and doors for the tired and poor, these policies specifically aim to
slam that door in their face and construct a wall in front of it. If
the United States wants to truly stand for equality, liberty, and
justice for All Persons, it cannot continue to detain immigrants
seeking a better life nearly indefinitely. To learn from our past,
we must argue the Japanese internment cases create a standard so
high it prevents indefinite or event-based detention of any person
based on their alienage, race, or national origin. Recently, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal and a Second Circuit
District Court found that an immigrant cannot be detained
indefinitely without serious constitutional concerns.230 This
finding came after finding a reasonable belief the petitioner could
not be removed despite their final removal order and a conviction
for engaging in terroristic activities.231 So why, then, should the
United States continue to allow the detention of people whose
only crime or fault is entering the country seeking a better life?
Moving the United States toward the values it is supposed to
protect in this situation merely requires learning from a past
mistake. Despite Korematsu’s ill-repute, the other cases, setting
the same standard, are still valid law.232 Thus, this law should be
used to ensure that similar liberty violations will cease and not
reoccur. Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Ex parte Endo, can and
should be used to require an extreme level national security
interest for prolonged civil detention based on race and national
origin.233 Then this standard, when applied to detained
immigrants, reveals the necessary interests are not met and
requires the release of immigrants.
Notably, the direct legal or policy driven argument against
detaining noncitizens is not the same as stating noncitizens can
never be detained or monitored. While the initial, and ideally
brief, processing period could allow detention for administrative
230. Hassoun v. Searls, 427 F. Supp. 3d, 357, 366, 372 (W.D.N.Y 2019).
(W.D.N.Y., 2019). Specifically, these Circuits found the regulation 8 C.F.R 241.14,
“authorized” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, to detain specific immigrants indefinitely was
unconstitutional.
231. See id. at 362.
232. See Karen Korematsu, How the Supreme Court Replaced One Injustice with
Another, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/RA8F-B2NX].
233. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 287 (1944).
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relief, there is no reason the detention must continue throughout
their hearing process.234 Instead, another form of monitoring
could be used to ensure the immigrants appear throughout their
proceedings without posing a threat to citizens. For instance, the
use of ankle monitors and required telephone check-ins or just
community programs allow for immigrants to continue life and
maintain their liberty.235 Further, that type of surveillance has a
93% success rate and less than half the cost of detention.236
However, for the asylum seeking population, and likely the
majority of the detained noncitizen population, these measures
are superfluous and only prolong the trauma they are fleeing,
albeit less than detention.237 For a population fleeing their homes
for fear of violence, persecution, and torture, the need to appear
in court for their hearings or notion of deportation is enough to
ensure appearance.238 The best solution, then, is to have a system
where immigrants are detained for the minimum amount of time
necessary to screen for health issues and begin asylum or visa
cases. Once the appropriate proceeding has been filed and health
screened, the immigrant should be released on bond, with a
monitor, or , ideally, with only the looming threat of voiding their
proceeding and deportation to ensure compliance. Ideally, the
system would release the immigrants with the minimum amount
of liberty impedance necessary. After all, the people currently
detained or monitored are victims of violence or threats of
violence to themselves and their families who do not need a
reminder or elongation of their trauma or they are people who just
want to a better life for themselves and their family.239

234. See Seeking Release from Immigration Detention, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 3 (Sept.
13, 2019),[https://perma.cc/K4K6-9LUB].
235. See Marouf, supra note 80, at 2164-70 (discussing community based alternatives
after electronic monitoring). Notably, while a more comprehensive discussion of more than
adequate alternatives is out of the scope of this paper, the Fatma Marouf article just cited
contains a fairly comprehensive discussion of the topic.
236. Healey, supra note 78, at 188.
237. Gogolak, supra note 229. Of note, though, the trauma from detention is
substantially worse.
238. Id.
239. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States immigration detention system prevents
the United States from truly standing for liberty, equality, and
justice by detaining immigrants seeking a better, safer life. The
United States has held people in detention, or internment camps,
based on their alienage and national origin through executive
orders solidified by case law pleading national security.
However, these orders and court decisions are deemed a disgrace
in the United States’ history.240 Now, the United States is again
holding people based on their alienage and national origin
through executive orders solidified by recent case law pleading
national security. To learn from its past mistakes, though, the
Japanese internment cases should be read to create a standard for
all civil detentions based on alienage and national origin. This
standard requires an extreme level of national security interest
akin to an imminent threat by unknown and indistinguishable
enemy combatants during wartime. This standard, when applied
to immigrant and asylum detentions, whose main national
security threat concerns resource allocation to a government
agency, fails to meet this standard.

240. Victor M. Silva, Readers React: Japanese internment is a disgrace now, and it
was a disgrace during WWII, LA TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018, 3:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/4A9MC9YA]

